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ABSTRACT
The first chapter of this thesis argues that allowing greater immigration from poor countries to
rich countries is a promising way to alleviate global poverty. Since guest worker programs may
be a politically realistic way of increasing immigration from poor countries to rich countries,
then if the argument in chapter one is successful, there are strong reasons for people who care
about reducing global poverty to support increased guest worker programs. However, some
philosophers argue that guest worker programs are unjust because they are likely to cause
worrisome relational inequalities between guest workers and full citizens. The second chapter of
this thesis argues that these relational egalitarian arguments against guest worker programs fail,
and that there are in fact strong relational egalitarian reasons to support increased guest worker
programs.
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INTRODUCTION
According to statistics from the United Nations Development Programme, in 2006, 830
million people were chronically undernourished, 1.1 billion people lacked access to clean
drinking water, and 2.6 billion people lacked access to basic sanitation.1 The scale of absolute
deprivation in the world is horrendous. It is perhaps even more appalling when contrasted with
the vast wealth of many citizens of the developed world. Some experts on global poverty, such as
economist Jeffrey Sachs, think that if the world’s rich were willing to forgo just a small fraction
of their current consumption and divert it to the world’s poor, severe poverty would be a thing of
the past.
That those of us who are lucky enough to be rich by global standards have thus far
demonstrated little willingness to make the relatively small sacrifices necessary to fund povertyreducing programs that Sachs and others advocate does not seem to reflect well on us, morally
speaking. According to Thomas Pogge, however, framing global poverty in this way actually
understates the magnitude of rich countries’ moral failings. Pogge argues that rich countries do
not just allow poverty to persist in poor countries; they actively perpetuate it by imposing a
global order on the poor that exacerbates global inequality and contributes to the violation of the
basic human rights of the world’s least well off.
Pogge’s argument is controversial. But whether or not Pogge’s particular moral
indictment of the world’s rich is correct, it is less controversial that severe poverty is bad and that
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we have reason to do our best to end it.2 This brings us to a more practical question: in order to
make severe poverty a thing of the past, what should we, as citizens of the world’s rich countries,
do? One thing that we could do (though by no means the only thing) is open our national borders
to allow more of the world’s poor to come live and work in our home countries and take
advantage of the many opportunities that are not available in their native countries. This
approach has intuitive appeal: it is one thing to not help somebody who is in need. It is another
thing to use state power to stop a needy person from moving from one place to another in search
of a better life.
However, some of philosophy’s most prominent anti-poverty advocates have been
(perhaps surprisingly) skeptical of the idea that more open immigration might be an important
part of an international effort to reduce global poverty. Two of these philosophers are Gillian
Brock and Thomas Pogge himself. I begin chapter one of this thesis with an examination of the
arguments that Brock and Pogge make for why advocates for the global poor should not
necessarily favor more immigration from poor countries to rich countries. For the sake of
comparison, I follow this discussion with a brief look at the anti-poverty policies that Pogge and
Brock themselves prefer. I proceed to evaluate Pogge and Brock’s reasons for opposing
increased freedom of movement from poor countries to rich countries, arguing that most of them
are unconvincing. Although increased low-skilled immigration is no silver bullet when it comes
to fighting global poverty, there probably are no such silver bullets. Increased immigration, in

2

What it means to “do our best,” and the precise content of the moral duties we have to alleviate
global poverty, are indeed controversial issues that aren’t addressed here. The fact that most
people accept that there is at least some reason to reduce severe poverty, and the fact that anyone
who accepts this has reason to care about how we should go about reducing severe poverty, is
enough to motivate the discussion in this thesis.
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conjunction with other policies, has an important role to play in the struggle to alleviate severe
global poverty.
Perhaps the strongest reason for anti-poverty advocates to be skeptical of the potential of
increased migration from poor countries to rich countries to reduce global poverty is that it is
politically unrealistic. There are various reasons for this. One important reason is expressed in a
famous quote by the economist Milton Friedman: “You cannot simultaneously have free
immigration and a welfare state.”3 The worry is that poor people will not migrate to rich
countries to seek out opportunities to make money as productive members of society, but rather
will take advantage of rich countries’ generous welfare systems. Now, whether immigrants are a
net drain on rich countries’ welfare programs is an empirical matter, and there is evidence that in
the long run immigrants in general often do not to impose a burden on the countries to which
they migrate.4 However, this likely depends on the rates of immigration and on the demographics
of the immigrant population. It seems that certain classes of immigrants (such as those without a
high school diploma) probably do impose at least a short-run fiscal burden on host countries.5 I
should acknowledge that the class of immigrants with which this thesis is primarily concerned,
those with low skills coming from developing countries, is more likely than some other classes
of immigrants to be a burden on host countries’ welfare systems. At any rate, the extent to which
some classes of immigrants are a fiscal drain on host countries is a complicated empirical
question that lies beyond the scope of this thesis. What matters for considerations of political
feasibility is that many citizens of the world’s rich countries perceive immigration as a threat to
3

Study With Milton Friedman. Perf. Milton Friedman. FR33MINDS, 2009. DVD.
Razin, Assaf, and Efraim Sadka. "Unskilled Migration: A Burden or a Boon for the Welfare
State?" Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102.3 (2000): 463-79.
5
See, for example, Smith, James, and Barry Edmonston, eds. The New Americans: Economic,
Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration. Rep. Washington, DC: National Academy,
1997. The National Academies Press. National Research Council.
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the welfare state, and thus strongly oppose open borders immigration policies. (By “open borders
policy,” I mean a policy under which law-abiding non-citizens are free to enter a country to live
or work for as long as they wish and are granted most of the same political rights as full citizens.)
Opposition to immigration on these grounds does not render infeasible all policies aimed
at reducing current restrictions on migration from poor countries to rich countries. Countries that
offer welfare benefits and other social services have criteria that must be met in order to be
eligible for these programs and citizenship generally. Additionally, a country does not need to
extend full citizenship status to all those who enter into its territory to live and work. Therefore,
it is at least possible for a country to allow people into its territory without granting them full
citizenship and the full range of rights that go along with being a full citizen, including rights to
benefit from subsidies and transfer programs. Many actually existing countries have policies like
these in place. They are commonly referred to as “guest worker” programs. Whether such a
program is desirable will, of course, depend somewhat on specifics. But if the first chapter of this
thesis is successful in arguing that increased immigration from poor countries to rich countries is
a promising global poverty alleviation policy, then the initial appeal of guest worker programs is
clear: they give people access to better opportunities than those that exist in their native countries
while avoiding one of the aspects of open border policies that makes them politically unfeasible.
Therefore, for those who care about poverty alleviation, guest worker programs are, absent
countervailing considerations, a policy that is worth supporting.
But regardless of the details about the policy disputes that mark any discussion of guest
worker programs, some prominent philosophers who have written on the subject argue that there
are countervailing conditions that justify opposition to most guest worker programs. These
philosophers tend to oppose guest worker programs because of their commitment to a view

5
called “relational egalitarianism”. Briefly, relational egalitarians believe that inequality matters
primarily to the extent that it makes individuals or groups vulnerable to oppression or domination
at the hands of other individuals or groups. Michael Walzer and Christopher Heath Wellman are
two philosophers who have written about guest worker programs and who endorse relational
egalitarianism. Walzer and Wellman accept two conclusions: (1) countries have the right to
exclude immigrants from entry and (2) countries that allow immigrants to enter face fairly strict
moral constraints on the rights that they may require immigrants to waive upon entry.
I begin chapter two of this thesis with a discussion of the different versions of relational
egalitarianism that Walzer and Wellman endorse. Next, I consider how these relational
egalitarian concerns apply to guest worker programs. Granting that relational egalitarians
highlight some good reasons to be wary of guest worker programs, I will argue that these
critiques do not, by themselves, justify rejecting guest worker programs as a component of a
reasonably just and humane immigration policy. This is because, as I will show, even
imperfectly designed guest worker programs have the potential to reduce the sort of inequality
with which relational egalitarians are concerned. If my main arguments in chapter one and
chapter two of this thesis are successful, then people who care about the plight of the world’s
poor have strong reason to include reasonably well-designed guest worker programs in the set of
global poverty alleviation policies that they support.

CHAPTER 1: Immigration and Poverty Alleviation

1.1 Economic Reasons for Supporting Increased Immigration
The moral case for allowing increased immigration can be made in a variety of ways.
Christopher Heath Wellman helpfully divides pro-immigration arguments into four categories:

6
egalitarian, libertarian, democratic, and utilitarian.6 In this chapter, I do not attempt to canvas all
the moral reasons in favor of reducing immigration restrictions. I argue in favor of increased
immigration on the relatively narrow grounds that it will reduce severe global poverty. To begin,
it is useful to discuss the economics of immigration, both in terms of theory and empirical
evidence. Some readers might think that my focus on severe global poverty, as well as my use of
economic arguments, means that my argument in this chapter presupposes utilitarian moral
theory. There is something right about this. Because of diminishing marginal utility, utilitarian
moral theory is straightforwardly concerned with the plight of the world’s poorest. Additionally,
“utility” is a central concept in both neoclassical economic theory and utilitarianism. However,
though my arguments here clearly resonate with utilitarianism in certain ways, I think it is wrong
to view them as primarily utilitarian in nature. Most plausible moral theories will agree that the
severe poverty that persists in the world today is a matter of grave moral concern. Thus, the
convincingness of my arguments in this chapter is not likely to depend on any particularly
controversial substantive moral commitments.
There is some disagreement among economists about the effect of increased migration on
the wages of native-born workers.7 However, there is a consensus among neoclassical
economists that increased immigration from poor countries to rich countries would result in large
welfare gains for the immigrants themselves. One of the most important factors determining a
worker’s wage is productivity. The more productive a worker is, the more valuable that worker is
to her employer, and the more the employer can afford to pay the worker while still making a
6

See chapters 2-5 in Wellman, Christopher Heath, and Phillip Cole. Debating the Ethics of
Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude? Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011.
7
For example, Sumption and Somerville write, “Public opinion tends to support the view that
immigrants take natives’ jobs and reduce their wages, yet a large body of research suggests that
this is not the case.” The UK's New Europeans: Progress and Challenges Five Years After
Accession." Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2010.
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profit. For example, if an hour of a worker’s labor creates $8 of value for her employer, then a
rational employer would never pay that worker more than $8 per hour, since the employer would
lose money by doing so. If that worker’s productivity doubles such that she is capable of
producing $16 of value for her employer per hour of labor, then the upper bound on her wage
also doubles to $16 per hour.
Worker productivity depends significantly on capital and infrastructure, which in turn
depend on the quality of institutions. Consider Don, a hypothetical agricultural laborer. Don is an
able-bodied man in his mid-twenties who has eight years of formal education and no specialized
skills. Since Don quit school at age 13, he has done work plowing, planting, weeding, and
picking crops. Consider two vegetable farms where Don could potentially work. Farm X is
located in a rich country. It has state-of-the-art equipment, sophisticated chemical fertilizers, it is
run somebody with an advanced degree in agricultural science, and the quality and mineral
content of its soil are closely monitored and maintained. Farm Y is in a developing country. Most
of its tools must be operated by hand or pulled by draught animals. Mismanagement of the
country’s water supply causes water availability to be unpredictable, which frequently causes
reduced yields. The country’s roads are in a state of terrible disrepair, and if bad weather hits,
they can become impassable for days or weeks at a time, causing vegetables to spoil before they
can reach consumers. The police force is corrupt, and truckers often must pay bribes at various
checkpoints between farm Y and the city where most of farm Y’s vegetables are sold. One both
farm X and farm Y, laborers like Don are an indispensable part of what goes into producing
vegetables and getting them to consumers. It should be clear that a typical hour of Don’s labor at
the margin will result in many more vegetables reaching consumers if Don works on farm X than
if Don works on farm Y. Because of conditions that are completely beyond Don’s control, Don’s
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labor, when combined with other inputs that go into producing vegetables, is much more
productive on farm X than on farm Y. As I illustrated above, a worker’s productivity is an
important determinant of his wages. Therefore, we can expect that Don will be paid more on
farm X than on farm Y. All else equal, it is strongly in Don’s interest to work on farm X rather
than farm Y. But because of the restrictive immigration policies that prevail throughout most of
the world, people like Don who are born into countries where all farms resemble farm Y often do
not have the option to work at farms like farm X. One important reason why workers in
developing countries earn so much less than workers in developed countries is this lack of access
to capital, infrastructure, and functional social and political institutions. (Of course, there are
other reasons why workers in rich countries are paid more; for one, workers in rich countries
tend to have more knowledge and skills than workers in poor countries.) These differences in
capital accumulation, infrastructure, and institutional quality between countries, combined with
strong restrictions on international labor movement, give rise to an economic phenomenon called
a “place premium”.
“Place premium” refers to the fact that an individual’s productivity (and therefore
earnings) varies significantly depending on the country the individual works in. For example,
according to an estimate by development economists Michael Clemens, Claudio Montenegro,
and Lant Pritchett, “a typical Bolivian-born, Bolivian-educated, prime-age urban male formalsector wage worker with moderate schooling makes... [a wage] higher by a factor of 2.7 solely
by working in the United States” instead of working in Bolivia.8 For some countries, this wage
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That place premiums exist is not controversial in the economics literature. What is much more
controversial is whether the existence of place premiums justifies loosening immigration
restrictions (since many economists are especially worried about the effect that increased lowskilled immigration has on the wages of low-skilled native workers). For more on place
premiums, see Clemens, Michael, Claudio Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett, "The Place Premium:
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gap between a worker in the worker’s country of origin and an otherwise identical worker in the
United States is as high as a factor of 8.4.9 Simply by crossing a border, the citizen of a poor
country can more (and sometimes significantly more) than double his earning potential. This
represents a staggering gain in economic welfare for potential poor country to rich country
migrants. To illustrate how enormously economically beneficial this potential exponential
increase of a poor person’s earning potential is, Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett helpfully
compare it to other anti-poverty programs. For example, they estimate that for a male, lowskilled Bangladeshi worker, the increase in present-value adjusted lifetime earnings from lifetime
access to microcredit is approximately equal to the increase in lifetime earnings resulting from
one month of work in the United States.10
A policy that would allow citizens of poor countries to take advantage of the place
premium in richer countries, rather than forcing them to stay in places where they are much less
productive, would significantly increase economic efficiency relative to the status quo. One
study from 1984 estimates that getting rid of legal restrictions on moving across international
borders would cause global GDP to approximately double.11 Of course, the elimination of
restrictions on crossing international borders is not a realistic policy. My point is merely to
illustrate the massive potential economic gains that could result from even modest reductions in

Wage Differences for Identical Workers across the US Border." The World Bank: Policy
Research Working Paper (2008).
9
ibid
10
ibid, 55
11
Hamilton, Robert, and John Whalley. "Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Global
Restrictions on Labor Mobility." Journal of Developmental Economics 14 (1984): 61-75. There
is of course bound to be controversy about the methodology used to measure the effect of such a
radical policy change. Additionally, this particular study is almost 30 years old. However, it at
least gives an indication of the potential magnitude of the effects of increased labor mobility on
economic productivity.
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immigration restrictions. A 2006 World Bank report included an analysis of the economic effects
of a more realistic increase in labor mobility. If an additional 16 million workers from lowincome countries went to work in high income countries, the estimated overall economic gain
would be $356 billion.12 As an economist might say, that represents a lot of dollar bills lying on
the street that we are failing to pick up. But the general economic inefficiency of international
restrictions on labor mobility is not a matter with which this thesis is directly concerned. More
important is that we can say with confidence that, because of the existence of Place Premiums,
allowing more workers from poor countries to work in rich countries makes the migrant workers
themselves economically better off. This appears to be a strong reason for someone concerned
with global poverty to support greater international freedom of movement.

1.2 Pogge’s and Brock’s Preferred Policies
However, despite what might seem to be strong reasons for reducing immigration
restrictions for low-skilled workers as a way of helping the world’s least well-off, there is not
very much enthusiasm for increased immigration from poor countries to rich countries among
prominent contemporary global justice theorists. Thomas Pogge says that advocating for more
immigration “is not a good way of discharging our responsibility” to the world’s poor.13 Gillian
Brock writes, “though some improvements could be made through developed countries adopting
progressive immigration policies, it is not clear that they outweigh a number of drawbacks that
also follow in the wake of increased immigration.”14

12

World Bank. Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of Remittances and
Migration. The World Bank. 2005.
13
Pogge, Thomas. "Migration and Poverty." Citizenship and Exclusion. Ed. Veit-Michael Bader.
New York: St. Martin's, 1997. 12-27, 12.
14
Brock, Gillian. Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009, 212.
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Part of the reason that Pogge and Brock oppose increased immigration from poor
countries to rich countries is that they think that even if more immigration from poor countries to
rich countries might on balance be good for the world’s poor, there are other, better ways of
helping the poor. I now briefly turn to their suggestions of how to do so.
Pogge famously argues for what he calls a Global Resources Dividend (or GRD for
short). To make up for the “uncompensated exclusion” of the poor from the world’s resources,
Pogge proposes the GRD, which imposes a small tax on all governments that decide to extract
natural resources that exist in their territory. Proceeds from this tax would then be distributed to
the world’s poor to ensure that their basic needs are met. Pogge estimates that the GRD would
only have to raise about $300 billion to accomplish this goal, so the tax could be quite small.15
Like Pogge, Brock also supports a global redistributive tax that would raise money for
poverty alleviation. However, she thinks that some more basic reforms are necessary in order to
make such a policy workable. Brock focuses on reforms aimed at reducing tax evasion and
increasing transparency. Large companies are often able to evade taxes by using tax havens. This
deprives all governments, but especially those of poor countries, of much-needed revenue.
Additionally, when poor countries’ resources are extracted and sold, the proceeds all too often do
not end up with the people. Instead, the countries’ corrupt ruling class siphons them off. To
combat these problems, Brock suggests that the international community needs to (1) find a way
of coordinating tax rates between countries to reduce opportunities for tax evasion and (2)
mandate that companies publish what they pay when they purchase resources so that citizens

15

Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 211
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(especially those of poor countries) have the information necessary to hold their governments
accountable.16
Brock argues that once transparency and tax reforms have been put into place, the
international community should impose some sort of global tax. She declines to endorse one
particular tax, but believes that a carbon tax, a currency transaction (or “Tobin”) tax, an air ticket
tax, an email tax, a tax on world trade, a tax on international arms trade, and an aviation fuel tax
are all promising ideas, and that imposing one or more of these taxes would raise money
necessary to provide global public goods and give poor countries more revenue put toward
meeting citizens’ basic needs.
So, though Pogge and Brock’s preferred policies differ somewhat from one another, what
they have in common is that they both argue for taxes imposed at the global level at least some
of the proceeds of which would go toward fulfilling the basic needs of the world’s poorest
people.

1.3 Objection: The Problem of Global Poverty is Too Big for Immigration to Solve
I will now turn to some of the main reasons that Pogge and Brock have for their
skepticism about increasing global freedom of movement. I will focus on three main antiimmigration arguments.
As the statistics mentioned at the beginning of my introduction indicate, there is a
distressingly large number of very poor people in the world. Perhaps the sheer scale of world
poverty is simply too big for changes in immigration policy to be of much help. This is the first
argument I consider. Thomas Pogge writes, “the number of needy persons in the world... is

16
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simply out of all proportion to the number of needy foreigners which the rich countries admit or
could admit.”17
Pogge gives two reasons for thinking this. The first is that the number of poor people in
the world is “out of all proportion” to the number of poor immigrants “which the rich countries
admit.”18 This is true, but what does it show? Just because current immigration policies do not
currently allow for nearly enough immigration from poor countries to rich countries to make a
significant dent in global poverty numbers does not mean that the policies could not be changed
so that they did. The reason why advocates of immigration as a poverty alleviation policy argue
for significantly more immigration is that they view current levels of immigration as
unacceptably low.
To be fair to Pogge, it is probably better to focus on the second claim he makes to support
his conclusion that there are too many poor people in the world for increased immigration to be a
promising anti-poverty measure: that rich countries, even if they were willing to admit
significantly more immigrants, simply could not do so. It is too bad that Pogge chooses not to
support this claim except by citing the numbers of immigrants that legally entered the European
Union in 1995, since it is unclear what Pogge means by “could.” Perhaps he means that there is
just no room in rich countries for immigration to occur on a massive scale. This is a point that
comes up from time to time in American political debates about immigration policy. But it is
unconvincing. If the entire population of the United States moved to Texas, leaving the rest of
the country completely vacant, then the population density of the state of Texas would be about
the same as the current population density of New Jersey. Some people might worry that a large
increase in population density would leave rich countries without enough room for leisure
17
18

Pogge, “Migration and Poverty,” 14
ibid
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activities or to grow food for the population. With a large enough population this would
obviously be a legitimate concern. But the populations of most rich countries are nowhere close
to reaching a level at which these sorts of concerns are pressing. Anybody who has traveled
across the middle of France has seen that there is lots of wilderness and farmland in France. In
fact, France is one of the world’s leading agricultural exporters. If the United States had the same
population density as France, its total population would be well over one billion. We have plenty
of space here for more people. Many other wealthy countries do as well.
Perhaps Pogge means that rich countries are not currently equipped to deal with the huge
increases in population that large-scale immigration would entail. Where would people live?
How would they get around? Where would their children go to school? There are clearly
challenges associated with rapid population increases, but I do not think that they are so great
that they justify abandoning increased immigration as a poverty alleviation policy, given its great
potential to help the world’s poor. If hundreds of millions of immigrants were dropped into rich
countries by helicopter tomorrow, it is only reasonable to expect chaos. But immigration flows
from poor to rich countries could be increased somewhat gradually to allow rich countries time
to make necessary adjustments. Between the years 2000 and 2009, the population of Raleigh, NC
grew by 40%.19 My understanding is that this growth has posed some challenges to the city of
Raleigh, but none that are insurmountable. Of course, the sort of immigration that I am talking
about is importantly different from the intra-national migration that was the primary source of
Raleigh’s rapid population growth, since it involves large numbers of low-skilled workers from
very different cultures.

19

Koebler, Jason. "10 Metro Areas With the Largest Population Growth." US News. U.S.News
& World Report, 06 Apr. 2011.
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An interesting comparison is the massive immigration from the former Soviet bloc to
Israel that took place near the end of the twentieth century. Between 1989 and 2002, 1.1 million
citizens of former Soviet Bloc countries took advantage of the Law of Return to immigrate to
Israel.20 In 1985, just before this era of mass immigration, Israel’s total population was 4.3
million.21 Unsurprisingly, this wave of immigrants overwhelmed Israel’s existing infrastructure.
In particular, there was a severe housing shortage. A 1991 Los Angeles Times article tells of
recent Russian immigrants living in converted chicken coops because they were unable to find
suitable housing.22 Additionally, there was a large spike in unemployment. As word spread to
prospective immigrants in former Soviet countries that there were no homes or jobs in Israel,
immigration rates dropped off.23 In the next few years, Israel made necessary adjustments to
accommodate more immigrants: homes were built, the economy grew, and unemployment
declined. In the decades since the early 1990s, housing density, labor force participation rates,
and life expectancy of immigrants from former Soviet countries have begun to converge with the
housing density, labor force participation rates, and life expectancy of the veteran Israeli
population.24
The case of Israeli immigrants from former Soviet countries shows that large waves of
immigration from relatively poor countries to relatively rich countries are possible and do not
wreak havoc on the receiving country. I do not deny that there will be significant challenges for
policymakers associated with large-scale migration from poor countries to rich countries. But
20

Karasenty, Yogev, and Shmuel Rosner. "What Million Missing Israelis?" Foreign Policy 28
July 2011.
21
CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion. Rep. Paris: International Energy Agency, 2012.
22
Williams, Daniel. "Unemployment, Poor Housing Slow Immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel."
Los Angeles Times, 29 Dec. 1991.
23
Ibid.
24
Yaffe, Nurit, and Dorith Tal. Immigration to Israel from the Former Soviet Union. Rep.
Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Immigration Absorption, 2001.
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there are challenges associated with almost any significant change in policy. If critics want to
show that challenges associated with significant increases in migration are great enough to make
increased migration an all things considered bad policy option, then they need to give much
stronger evidence in support of their view than what Pogge provides.

1.4 Objection: Immigration Fails to Help the World’s Worst Off
Looking at the kinds of people who are among those who are willing and able to take
advantage of opportunities to emigrate yields a second kind of argument for why those
concerned about the plight of the world’s poor should not advocate increased immigration. Most
immigrants that rich countries currently admit are not among the world’s worst off before
immigrating. Pogge suggests that this is because if one wants to emigrate to a rich country, “it
helps a very great deal, in the scramble to gain admission, to have money for bribing officials,
for paying smugglers, and for hiring a lawyer; to have some education, professional skills, and
language training.”25 People with these advantageous characteristics, however, are usually
reasonably well off. Additionally, when these immigrants send remissions to their families back
home in their poor native countries, the families receiving the money are usually not among the
least well-off citizens of the country. According to Brock, “direct effects on the very poor
through remittances may be limited.”26 I will address these arguments in turn.
One reason why most immigrants are not among the least well-off in their countries of
origin is that rich people have more money with which to grease the wheels of the immigration
system than poor people. This is undeniably true, but how is it relevant to Pogge’s claim that
immigration itself is not a good poverty alleviation policy? One difficulty in designing just public
25
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policy is that well-intentioned policies tend to be corrupted and favor the interests of the rich and
powerful at the expense of the poor. Almost any sort of policy reform will be vulnerable to this
problem. Thus, the fact that one particular actually existing policy tends to be skewed toward the
interests of the rich rather than the poor is not a convincing reason to conclude that the general
policy in question cannot, with some reform, be used to help the poor. What would qualify as a
good reason to draw such a conclusion is if the policy in question was more likely to be captured
by the wealthy and powerful and turned against the poor than some alternative policy. But Pogge
provides no reason why we should think that immigration policy is more likely to be hijacked by
the rich and powerful than Pogge’s preferred alternative of taxation and redistribution. Pogge
himself points out elsewhere that programs with the ostensible goal of promoting development in
poor countries usually end up allocating money according to the perceived national self-interest
of rich donor countries.27 In contemporary American political discourse, the fact that Warren
Buffett is taxed at a lower rate than his secretary is frequently invoked to illustrate the extent to
which the American tax regime has been skewed in favor of the rich. But if these facts do not
necessarily entail that Brock’s and Pogge’s preferred policies of taxation combined with
redistribution are not a good way of securing the human rights of the world’s poor, it is unclear
why Pogge thinks that the fact that current immigration policy tends to favor the rich over the
poor supports his claim that immigration is not a promising poverty alleviation policy. If
immigration policies were reformed in a way that made it easier to immigrate, that itself would
reduce the amount of resources needed to successfully immigrate.
A related but in my view more challenging objection that Pogge makes is that even if rich
countries open their doors to significantly more poor foreigners than they currently do, it is not
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usually the very poor who immigrate. If we reflect for a moment on the situations that the global
poor face, it would not be surprising if Pogge’s claim were true. It is difficult and expensive to
move from one place to another. The difficulty and cost of moving increases with distance, and
many of the world’s poor are located a long way away from the rich countries to which they
could potentially migrate. There are many poor people who are willing to go to incredible
lengths and incur extraordinary costs to relocate to places that they believe offer better
opportunities than their home countries. But Pogge is primarily concerned with people who are
not just poor, but truly destitute. A person who is starving, severely malnourished, or very sick is
unlikely to be able to make the long journey that most migrations require. Clemens and Pritchett
present evidence suggesting that the movement of low-skilled workers from poor countries to the
United States primarily results in direct benefits to people who would make less than $10 per day
if they were unable to leave their native countries.28 This may support Pogge’s point: the people
with whom Pogge is primarily concerned, those who live on less than $1 or $2 per day, are
usually not the direct beneficiaries of immigration (although according to the evidence that
Clemens and Pritchett present, it is likely that immigration to the United States has directly
benefited a non-trivial number of Haitians who otherwise would live in destitute poverty).29 As a
caveat, I would point out that we should be careful about assuming, based on current
immigration flows, that the destitute cannot be direct beneficiaries of reduced immigration
restrictions to rich countries. As Pogge points out and as I discuss above, current immigration
laws, like most policies, favor the rich and powerful at the expense of the poor. Thus, it is
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possible that if legal barriers to immigration were reduced, then more desperately poor people
would benefit from immigration than currently available empirical evidence would suggest.
However, I grant that it is probably true that people in severe poverty will likely not be
primary direct beneficiaries of immigration reforms allowing more people from poor countries to
work in rich countries. But what about indirect effects? I consider two indirect effects of
immigration of low-skilled workers from poor countries to rich countries. The first, which Pogge
and Brock do not consider, is the reduction of poor countries’ domestic supply of low-skilled
labor. The second, which Pogge and Brock do consider, is remittances.
One challenge for poor countries in the early stages of development is that they tend to
have large numbers of low skilled workers who are either unemployed or severely
underemployed, working in subsistence agriculture or in the informal sector. I discussed above
how labor productivity sets an upper bound on workers’ wages. According to conventional
economic theory, the lower bound on a worker’s wage for a given job depends on how much that
worker can make doing something else. If employer A offers worker W a job that pays $8 per
hour, but worker W can get $10 per hour working for employer B, then employer A will have to
increase her offer to at least $10 per hour in order to attract worker W. (Here we hold all else
equal, of course; the situation becomes more complicated when, for example, the jobs are
different levels of difficulty, when one job is more dangerous than the other, and when there are
transaction costs.) Of course, whether or not employer A will be willing to pay worker W $10
per hour rather than $8 per hour depends on whether or not there are other workers who would
be willing to take the job for $8 per hour and who would be capable of doing the same quality of
work as worker W.
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Therefore, when countries are in the early stages of development, one significant drag on
wage increases for employed low-skilled workers is the existence of a large number of lowskilled, impoverished, unemployed or underemployed workers who, since their alternatives are
so grim, are desperate enough to work for extremely low pay. Hence, for wages in poor countries
to increase, the unemployment rate must decrease. This can take years. During this time, people
suffer. The lucky people who are employed work long, difficult hours for little money. The
unlucky people who are unemployed or underemployed must struggle to meet their most basic
needs in the informal sector of the economy. It is in this category of unemployed and
underemployed low-skilled workers in developing countries where many of the destitute people
with which Pogge and Brock are primarily concerned are found. The families and children of
people in this category are also likely to be destitute. For many of these people, the sooner they
can get jobs in the formal sector of the economy, and the faster that their wages can increase
once they do succeed in finding work in the formal sector, the sooner these people will be able to
make significant progress in improving their living conditions.30
Thus, although it may be true that low-skilled workers who migrate to rich countries are
generally not themselves in desperate poverty, they do compete for a limited number of lowskilled jobs with people who are in desperate poverty. If increased migration can reduce the
overall number of low-skilled workers in poor countries, it is likely that people who are currently
living in destitute poverty will benefit, even if they are not the ones who migrate. I think that the
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potentially beneficial indirect effects that I have described are quite plausible,31 since they are a
straightforward implication of commonly accepted economic theory. Anybody who is concerned
with improving the lot of the world’s least well-off should give these beneficial indirect effects
of migration serious consideration, which Pogge and Brock do not.
I will now turn my attention to the second indirect effect of poor country to rich country
migration: remittances. Direct beneficiaries of remissions are usually family members of
immigrants working in rich countries. Both Pogge and Brock take a dismissive attitude toward
remittances, largely because the families of remittance-sending immigrants, like most
immigrants themselves before they leave their home countries, tend not to be desperately poor.
Thus, while remittances may make poor people better off, they likely do not tend to directly
benefit the least well-off citizens of poor countries with which Pogge and Brock are primarily
concerned.
In my view, the strongest argument to be made in favor of remittances is that, by
increasing the income of the poor (though not destitute), they increase private consumption,
31
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which increases demand for goods and service and, as Brock notes, promote “opportunities for
further jobs and new markets. When remittances are spent on consumption of domestically
produced goods or services there can be multiplier effects.”32 Clemens writes that, even with
relatively low current levels of immigration, “remittances are now several times larger than
global flows of foreign aid.”33 If immigration flows were dramatically increased, then
remittances would play an even greater role in increasing wealth of the citizens of poor countries.
This would in turn have a much greater effect on demand for domestic goods and services in
poor countries than do remittances at current levels. The domestic jobs created by this increased
demand for domestic goods and services, combined with reduced size of the domestic lowskilled labor force that I discuss above, are significant and plausible ways in which movement of
low-skilled workers from poor countries to rich countries could have strongly beneficial effects
for even the most destitute citizens of poor countries.

1.5 Objection: The Effects of Remittances on Life Back Home
Not only do remittances often not go to the very poor, but there are also worries about
potential negative effects that they may have on immigrants’ home countries. This is the third
argument (or perhaps more accurately, group of arguments) against immigration as a poverty
alleviation policy that I consider. Recipients of remittances may become dependent on them and
choose not to hold their own jobs. Recipients of remittances are also more likely to want to
emigrate themselves than the general population, which makes it harder for local, self-sufficient
economies to develop in immigrants’ home countries. Additionally, remittances tend to fall off
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over time. Immigrants remit the most of their earnings three to five years after moving to their
host country; as time away from their home country becomes greater than this, remittances tend
to fall off.34
Pogge speculates that remittances could actually make conditions worse for people living
in destitute poverty. Some money from remittances, according to Pogge, “will... be used to
cement and entrench the oppression of the poorest by Third-World ‘elites’... these funds are far
more likely to increase than to reduce domestic inequality in the poor countries and therefore are
a mixed blessing at best.”35 These are strong claims. It seems to me that they should only be
accepted if accompanied by strong evidence. Unfortunately, Pogge does not provide any. Absent
evidence, I see no reason to believe that the low-skilled immigrants with which this thesis is
primarily concerned and the families of those low-skilled immigrants are part of the oppressive
“Third-World elite,” even if they may tend to be slightly better off than their poorest conationals.
Brock’s criticisms of remittances are, I think, more plausible than Pogge’s, but for the
most part are also unconvincing. Brock worries that remittances reduce recipients’ labor force
participation. She writes, “the inflow of funds [from remittances] can create dependence for
recipients.”36 By using the word “dependence,” which has clear negative connotations, Brock
seems to assume that reduced labor force participation is necessarily a bad thing. But I do not
think that this assumption is warranted. First, as I argue above, reduced competition for low-skill
jobs may well be beneficial for destitute people who desperately need such jobs. Second, it
seems to me that having the ability to work less and spend more time on other projects is often a

34

Brock, 206-207
Pogge, “Migration and Poverty,” 15
36
Brock, 207

35

24
positive development in the life of the person who is able to make such a choice. I see no reason
to believe that it would not be a positive development for citizens of developing countries.
Brock proceeds to argue that recipients of remittances are more likely to want to emigrate
themselves, which “often has the effect of encouraging more people to emigrate, consequently
crippling the region’s ability to develop its own economy.”37 More clarity is necessary before
this claim can be evaluated. What does it mean for a region to “develop its own economy”? In
the context of a discussion of immigration and remittances, it presumably means that a region is
able to provide local jobs for its residents so that they do not have to go to another country in
search of work. Some people seem to think that there is something intuitively desirable about a
community being able to provide employment opportunities for its native residents so that they
may stay if they so choose. But even those who have such an intuition must recognize that there
are other important countervailing factors to consider as well. People tend not to endure long
journeys to foreign countries for no good reason. They tend to undertake such journeys in order
to take advantage of opportunities that are significantly better than those available in the places
that they leave. So even if we grant that there is something valuable about preserving
opportunities for people in their home regions, we must recognize that sometimes the cost of
preserving these opportunities is quite dear: hampering poor people’s ability to take advantage of
opportunities in other places that poor people themselves judge to be significantly better. I am
skeptical that there are many cases in which the moral desirability of the former outweighs the
moral desirability of the latter.
The final reason Brock gives for doubting the potential of remissions to improve the
conditions in poor countries is that “[t]ime spent away can dramatically affect the willingness to
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remit.” After three to five years, “remittances often fall off considerably.”38 Even if this is a
legitimate concern, it does not entail that we should support restrictive immigration policies. As
Brock notes, one possible response to the tendency of remittances to fall off after a certain time
period is for rich countries to only grant temporary work visas. This way, immigrants would
have to return home after a few years away and the remittances would not fall off. This strikes
me as plausible response to Brock’s worry. I am not convinced that it would the best policy, but
because of space constraints, I leave further elaboration for another time.

1.6. The Urgency of Ending Global Poverty
Poverty is an urgent problem. This is an important reason why Pogge and Brock think
that the optimal set of poverty alleviation policies is global taxation combined with programs that
redistribute to the world’s poorest people and fund basic public goods and services in poor
countries. People are dying every day. We must act immediately. If Pogge and Brock’s preferred
policies were put in place, and if they worked the way Pogge and Brock hope (a big if), then
poverty would soon be a thing of the past. The same cannot be said for increased immigration.
The indirect benefits of increased immigration for the desperately poor that I highlight in this
chapter would take time to come about. Additionally, increased immigration is politically
unrealistic. Even modest increases in immigration are politically unpopular in rich countries.
But however undeniably urgent a moral problem severe poverty may be, it most likely
will not go away quickly. Although radical reforms to immigration policy are unlikely, it is also
unlikely that proposals like Pogge’s and Brock’s will be put into place in the near future. And
even if they are implemented, how confident should we be that they will actually succeed rather
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than falling prey to corruption by the rich and powerful like so many other well-intentioned
policy reforms? I do not intend these remarks to be criticisms of Pogge and Brock. To both of
their credits, they devote a lot of thought to considering how institutional schemes could be
designed to avoid this problem. My point is only that if severe global poverty is ever to be
eradicated, it will probably not happen quickly, and is unlikely to be the result of just one set of
policy reforms. Thus, just because poverty-alleviating immigration reforms are politically
unrealistic does not by itself entail that advocates of the global poor should not advocate them.
After all, we have to start somewhere. It is not pleasant to take the long view on the problem of
global poverty. However, we may have no choice.

1.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that allowing more low-skilled workers from poor countries
to migrate to rich countries is a potentially important aspect of a broader set of policies aimed at
reducing (and hopefully eliminating) global poverty. Specifically, I have tried to address some of
Thomas Pogge and Gillian Brock’s concerns that increased immigration is not a promising way
to help the world’s most severely impoverished people. In particular, giving low-skilled workers
more opportunities to migrate from poor countries to rich countries is likely to have highly
beneficial indirect effects on the world’s worst off. I have not been able to address all of the
concerns that Pogge and Brock (not to mention others) have with proposals to increase
immigration, but I hope that I have done enough to show that immigration deserves more serious
consideration as a poverty alleviation policy than it usually gets.
If my argument in this chapter is successful, then it means that the restrictive immigration
policies that are nearly ubiquitous in the world today have disastrous consequences for the wellbeing of the world’s poorest people. What can we do to improve the situation? Unfortunately,
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support among the general public for reducing immigration restrictions is weak. In a 2011 Gallup
poll, 43% of Americans said that present levels of immigration should be decreased, 35% said
they should be kept the same, and only 18% said they should be increased.39 In 2011, 1.06
million people obtained permanent resident status in the United States and an additional 3.39
million people entered the United States as temporary workers and family members of temporary
workers.40 Meanwhile, the total population of the United States is over 300 million. It is
unfortunate that support for increased immigration among the American public is so low despite
the fact that current immigration flows are already quite small relative to the total population. (It
is also unfortunate that citizens of other rich countries tend not to be much more supportive than
Americans of proposals to increase immigration.)
Clearly, there is a difficult political problem associated with reducing immigration
restrictions. It is well beyond the scope of this thesis to give this problem comprehensive
treatment. However, I will consider the ethics of one controversial policy that, as I explain in the
introduction, may be a politically realistic (compared to alternatives) way of reducing
immigration restrictions: guest worker programs. This is the task to which I turn in chapter 2.

CHAPTER 2: A Defense of Guest Worker Programs

2.1 Relational Egalitarianism
The critics of guest worker programs that I discuss in this chapter are relational
egalitarians. Explanations of relational egalitarianism usually begin by explaining what relational
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egalitarianism is not. Prominent twentieth century political philosophers such as Richard
Arneson, G. A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, and Thomas Nagel defend different versions of luck
egalitarianism. It is a simple fact about the human condition that different individuals have
different life prospects partially because of luck. This seems unfair. Luck egalitarians think
justice is about minimizing this unfairness.
While minimizing unfairness seems like a plausible goal for somebody concerned with
equality, Elizabeth Anderson, a prominent relational egalitarian, argues that luck egalitarians
have lost sight of what the point of equality really is. According to Anderson, the primary focus
of egalitarianism should be “the relationships within which goods are distributed, not only the
distribution of goods themselves.”41 More specifically, “Negatively, egalitarians seek to abolish
oppression—that is, forms of social relationship by which some people dominate, exploit,
marginalize, demean, and inflict violence upon others.... Positively, egalitarians seek a social
order in which persons stand in relations of equality.”42 Understood this way, relational
egalitarianism has important implications for how inequality matters in the context of
international justice. Relational egalitarians argue that inequality between people who live in the
same country is more concerning than inequality between people who live in different countries.
To somebody with cosmopolitan sympathies, this may seem implausible. If all people have equal
moral standing, then shouldn’t global, rather than national, inequality be what is most relevant in
global justice?
Relational egalitarians have a response to this cosmopolitan line of criticism: there are
morally relevant differences between inequalities that exist between citizens of the same country
and inequalities that exist between people who are not citizens of the same country. Inequality
41
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between co-nationals is especially concerning because people who are citizens of the same
country are related to each other in a way that people who are citizens of different countries are
not. To illustrate this point, Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, who approvingly
cite Anderson’s version of relational egalitarianism, ask us to consider two instances of
inequality. In the first instance, there is society A, in which everybody is equally affluent, and
society B, in which everybody is equally poor. A and B are on opposite sides of the world and
have never had any contact with each other. In the second instance, there is only society C, in
which there is a group of citizens as affluent as those in society A and another group of citizens
as poor as those in society B. We should worry much more about the instance of inequality
involving society C than the one involving A and B, Altman and Wellman argue, because the
fact that inequality in society C exists within a single political community creates the possibility
of marginalization, oppression, exploitation, and other problematic forms of social relation that
could not exist between citizens of A and citizens of B.43
In addition to their discussion of Anderson’s views, Altman and Wellman also draw on
Michael Walzer’s account of relational egalitarianism (which was developed before Anderson’s,
and before the view even came to be known as relational egalitarianism). Walzer writes that
according to his version of egalitarianism, “It’s not the fact that there are rich and poor that
generates egalitarian politics but the fact that the rich ‘grind the faces of the poor,’ impose their
poverty upon them, command their deferential behavior.... The experience of subordination—of
personal subordination, above all—lies behind the vision of equality.”44 Altman and Wellman
recognize that this account is somewhat different from Anderson’s, and indeed it is. What the
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two approaches share is that according to both, “equality, as a demand of justice, must be
understood in a way that is sensitive to the relationships within which social goods are
distributed.”45 Altman and Wellman say that preventing oppression is the primary focus of
relational egalitarianism. For example, they write, “[a]ccording to the brand of relational
egalitarianism we favor, the key issue concerns which inequalities facilitate oppressive
relationships.”46
Because of the central role that oppression plays in the account of relational
egalitarianism that Altman and Wellman endorse, the present discussion depends significantly on
what exactly we mean by “oppression.” Although I find it difficult to discern exactly what the
word “oppression” means for Anderson or Altman and Wellman, I offer this as a formulation:
“the exercise of power by one person or group of people over another person or group of people
in a way that objectionably disadvantages the latter.” This way of understanding of the word
“oppression” is, I think, a reasonable approximation of what ordinary speakers mean when they
use the word.
A careful reading of Walzer, however, reveals that he has a somewhat different
understanding of the main focus of relational egalitarianism than Anderson. Altman and
Wellman recognize this, writing that the difference between Anderson and Walzer is that “[t]he
wrong is variously identified as oppression [for Anderson] or domination [for Walzer].”47
However, this sentence and a brief footnote are all that they devote to acknowledging the
difference between Anderson’s and Walzer’s views. But the differences between Anderson’s
and Walzer’s views are important and significant.
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Consider, for example, the Walzer quote from above. Some of the concerns that Walzer
articulates seem to be related to oppression; for example, the concern that the rich impose
poverty upon the poor. However, Walzer seems to show even more concern for something
different: that the rich “grind the faces of the poor... [and] command their deferential behavior.”
Walzer emphasizes the “experience of subordination.”48 If I have understood the concept of
“oppression” correctly, then it does not exactly capture these worries. Group A experiencing
subordination at the hands of another group B does not necessarily entail that B is taking
advantage of A, exploiting A, or that B is making its own members better off by making
members of A worse off. The experience of subordination of one group by another covers a
much broader range of cases—in particular, cases in which one person or group of persons does
not stand in a relation of social equality to another person or group of persons.
It seems to me that relational egalitarianism, in the various versions discussed here,
encompasses a family of related but distinct concerns. To set up my discussion of guest worker
programs, I want to clearly delineate two categories of problems arising from unequal
relationships. Both articulate concerns that fall under the scope of relational egalitarianism.
However, for my purposes, there are important differences between them.
The first category I will call oppressive relational inequalities. Into this category fall
cases in which one person or group of people has a relation with another person or group of
people that allows the former to exploit or take advantage of the latter (or to oppress the latter, as
I define oppression above). A contemporary example of an oppressive relational inequality
would be the disparity of influence on the American political process between the 1% (the
richest 1% of United States citizens) and the 99% (all United States citizens not among the
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richest 1%) that the Occupy Wall Street movement has recently highlighted. The idea here is that
the 1% rigs the political system in a way that promotes its own economic self-interest at the
expense of the 99%. (I take no stand here on whether this is an accurate account of what happens
in our political system; I claim only that if it were true, it would be a good example of oppressive
relational inequality.)
The second category I will call personally degrading relational inequalities. Into this
category fall cases in which one person (or group of people) fails to treat another person (or
group of people) as his social equal. An example of an interaction that would likely constitute a
personally degrading relational inequality would be owners of an inn who refuse to rent a room
to a same-sex couple because the owners are opposed to homosexuality.49 The owners treat the
same-sex couple differently than they would treat another couple on the basis of morally
arbitrary features,50 thereby denying the couple the respect and recognition of equal social
standing that they deserve in virtue of being persons. Oppressive and personally degrading
relational inequalities may overlap, and an unequal relationship that begins as one may
eventually come to include elements of the other. However, I think that there is an important
conceptual distinction between the two, and that it is a distinction worth making when
considering the implications of relational egalitarian insights on guest worker programs. The
crucial point is that an oppressive inequality need not involve personal degradation.
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While Altman and Wellman (and Wellman alone in Debating the Ethics of Immigration:
Is there a Right to Exclude?) seem to focus mostly on oppressive relational inequalities, they
sometimes also refer to personally degrading relational inequalities (for example, in their
approving citation of Walzer, and in an analogy that Wellman employs that I discuss below).
Walzer, for his part, seems to focus primarily on personally degrading inequalities, although he
does discuss oppressive inequalities as well (for example, with his worry about the rich
“imposing [the poor’s] poverty upon them”). At any rate, keeping the distinction between the
oppressive and personally degrading relational inequalities in mind will help me to show what I
think is wrong with some arguments that Walzer and Wellman make against guest worker
programs.

2.2 Walzer and Wellman on Guest Workers
In his discussion of guest worker programs, Walzer considers Western European
countries that, during the time that he was writing Spheres of Justice, habitually brought in lowskilled laborers from lower-income countries. Affluent Western European countries with strong
labor unions had a hard time attracting domestic workers to low-paying, physically difficult and
dangerous jobs. However, for the overall functioning of the country, it was necessary to find
people willing to do these jobs. An obvious solution was to establish guest worker programs that
imported workers willing to take jobs that native workers were not. The guest workers that
Walzer discusses lived under harsh conditions relative to citizens of the countries in which they
were working. They worked long hours, were not given access to social services, and their
residency was conditional on having employment.51
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The programs in question were consciously designed so that the workers did not have
opportunities to integrate themselves into local culture and society or build and maintain social
relationships. For example, Walzer writes that the workers were “either prevented or discouraged
from bringing dependents along with them, and they [were] housed in barracks, segregated by
sex, on the outskirts of the cities where they work[ed].”52 As is the case with any guest worker
program, the workers were not given the right to vote. Because of this lack of political voice, the
guest workers Walzer discusses experience the state “as a pervasive and frightening power that
shapes their lives and regulates their every move—and never asks for their opinion.... [The guest
workers] are typically an exploited or oppressed class as well, and they are exploited or
oppressed at least in part because they are disenfranchised, incapable of organizing effectively
for self-defense.”53 According to Walzer’s analysis, keeping the workers from improving their
condition was part of the point of having a guest worker program: wealthy European countries
established guest worker programs in order to find people who were willing to work for lower
wages and in worse conditions than domestic workers. If the workers had the political and social
standing necessary to make things better for themselves, then their employers would eventually
have to pay them more and improve their working conditions, which is exactly the situation these
wealthy European states sought to avoid.
The guest worker programs that Walzer analyzes were obviously problematic from the
perspective of relational egalitarianism. They made possible a range of both oppressive and
personally degrading relational inequalities. The denial of political and social standing of guest
workers was for the express purpose of preventing them from improving their wages or working
conditions. This was an obvious instance of oppressive relational inequality. Assuming, again,
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that Walzer’s description of the situation is accurate, European host countries then took
advantage of guest workers’ disadvantaged situations. An instance of personally subordinating
relational inequality in Walzer’s discussion of guest workers that would exist to some extent in
any guest worker arrangement is the denial of citizenship rights itself along with a lack of a clear
path to citizenship. Citizenship is socially significant, and having some people in a society who
are full citizens with others who are denied citizenship creates inequalities that give the relational
egalitarian cause for concern.
Most citizens of the United States of America are patriots to at least some extent. There is
something about their very status as “Americans” (using the term narrowly to refer to United
States citizens) that makes them feel proud and fosters a bond between them and their fellow
Americans. Allowing people to become temporary members of American society, and not
granting them the status of citizenship, restricts their access to patriotic relational bonds and the
sense of pride that many people feel in virtue of being full citizens of the United States. To be
clear, I am not saying that a non-citizen is incapable of patriotism or of fellow feeling for other
individuals in a political community. But having lived most of my life in the United States, I
think that there is something about the status of citizenship itself that many people take to be an
important part of their self-conceptions and that many people feel binds them to others who have
the same status. If this phenomenological claim about citizenship is plausible, then the denial of
citizenship status to guest workers is an example of personal degradation that, for relational
egalitarians, it is objectionable.54 Although my main purpose in this chapter is to show why
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relational egalitarians should be more amenable to guest worker programs than Wellman and
(especially) Walzer are, I do not wish to deny that there is room for legitimate relational
egalitarian criticism of guest worker programs. To the contrary, I insist that there is.
Having granted the legitimacy of Walzer’s concerns with the guest worker programs that
he considers, and having acknowledged that some of these concerns may apply to guest worker
programs in general, I will now discuss where I think that Walzer is, on relational egalitarian
grounds, mistaken. He writes,
Men and women are either subject to the state’s authority, or they are not; and if they
are subject, they must be given a say, and ultimately an equal say, in what that
authority does. Democratic citizens, then, have a choice: if they want to bring in new
workers, they must be prepared to enlarge their own membership; if they are
unwilling to accept new members, they must find ways within the limits of the
domestic labor market to get socially necessary work done. And those are their only
choices.55

The first sentence of this quotation is baffling for a couple of reasons. First, Walzer’s use of the
word “subject” is odd. As a citizen of the United States, I am subject to the political authority of
the United States. But if I go to Paris, then I am subject to France’s political authority, my lack of
French citizenship notwithstanding. The second reason that the sentence is baffling is that it is
actually false. If I visit Paris for a week, even though I am subject to France’s political authority,
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it does not seem that I deserve a say (and I certainly do not deserve an equal say) in what France
does with its political authority.
Putting those problems aside, the main reason for rejecting Walzer’s strong claim about
the impermissibility of guest worker programs is this: just because relational egalitarians have
reasons to worry about guest worker programs, does not support a conclusion nearly as strong as
the claim that democratic states must not allow guest workers at all. After a brief discussion of
Wellman’s position on guest worker programs, I will spend the rest of the chapter giving
argumentative support for this assertion that Walzer’s position on guest worker programs is
mistaken.

2.3 A Relational Egalitarian Defense of Guest Worker Programs
Wellman agrees that Walzer’s conclusion is too strong. According to Wellman, there is
no necessary problem with guest worker programs that only allow immigrants into the host
country “for a duly limited period” of time. (Wellman does not specify exactly how long a period
qualifies as duly limited.) At the same time, “we would want to examine carefully arrangements
on a case-by-case basis to ensure that the workers are not put in positions where they are
objectionably vulnerable to oppression.”56 To be fair to Wellman, he reasonably acknowledges
that it is possible for the beneficial consequences of a situation to outweigh concerns about
relational inequalities.57 This makes Wellman much harder to pin down than Walzer. However, I
think that Wellman’s position can be criticized on the same grounds as Walzer’s. To make a
convincing relational egalitarian argument against guest worker programs, it is not enough to
show that guest worker programs are instances of worrisome inequalities. They must show that
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inequalities associated with guest worker programs are more worrisome than inequalities
associated with keeping those who would participate in a guest worker program from
immigrating at all. In this section, I argue not that beneficial consequences associated with
allowing temporary workers to enter the country should outweigh relational egalitarian worries
about guest worker programs, but rather that there are good specifically relational egalitarian
reasons for giving non-citizen workers a legal way to enter the country for work purposes.
The main flaw in the relational egalitarian critiques of guest worker programs that I have
been considering is that they seem to assume (or sometimes simply assert) that relational
egalitarian concerns are necessarily more significant for relations between people who live in the
same territory than they are for relations that cross international boundaries. It would be unfair to
say that Walzer and Wellman completely fail to see that relational egalitarian concern transcends
borders; certainly Wellman, at least, recognizes this. But he does not seem to recognize the
extent to which the international status quo should raise concerns for relational egalitarians.
Recall Altman and Wellman’s discussion of inter-society inequality versus intra-society
inequality: suppose that everyone in society A is rich and everyone in separate society B is poor.
Now, suppose that the same disparity that exists between A and B exists within society C.
Because members of society C occupy the same political community, “they occupy relationships
that are affected by these inequalities,”58 and so the inequality that exists in society C is more
concerning than the inequality that exists between A and B. Altman and Wellman are careful to
stipulate that “no one in either A or B knows anything of the other society’s existence, since they
are on opposite sides of the earth and have never had any contact.”59 There is nothing wrong with
this stipulation if the goal is to clarify what is distinctive about the relational egalitarian approach
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versus other kinds of egalitarianism (which is primarily what Altman and Wellman are doing in
this passage). However, it is clear that in the real world, even societies that are geographically
separated have contact with each other, and are certainly aware of each other’s existence. Thus,
relationships between members of the same political community are not the only relationships
that are affected by inequalities. Relationships between members of different political
communities may be affected by inequalities as well. (Of course, it may still be true that
inequalities between co-nationals are more concerning than inequalities between members of
different political communities.) By focusing on relations between co-nationals and not on
relations between citizens of different nations, relational egalitarian analyses of guest worker
programs fail to appreciate how guest worker programs can alleviate problematic relational
inequalities.
Above, I made the distinction between oppressive relational inequalities and personally
degrading relational inequalities. It is the former that are relevant when considering international
relations, because personally degrading relational inequalities only come into play when there
are more robust social ties between people than those that normally exist in relations that cross
international borders. Thus, relational egalitarians should want to know the extent to which
international relationships in our world tend to leave one person or group of people vulnerable to
being oppressed, exploited, or taken advantage of by another person or group of people.
Although he does not himself discuss relational egalitarianism so far as I am aware,
Thomas Pogge’s writing raises issues that are especially relevant to the question at hand. Pogge
argues that wealthy countries not only fail to effectively aid the world’s poor, but also actively
harm them by supporting a global order that favors the rich and powerful at the expense of the
poor, powerless, and vulnerable. The rich rig the system against the poor in a variety of ways:
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subsidies on domestic products, tariffs on goods from developing countries, bribes for officials in
developing countries, purchases of natural resources from corrupt and illegitimate heads of state,
and loans to illegitimate, dysfunctional leaders. This exploitation of the world’s poor by the
world’s rich stems from an imbalance of power.60 Whereas rich countries have functional
political systems and sufficient resources to effectively represent the interests of their citizens at
the global level, poor countries do not. Thus, when there is a conflict of interest between a poor
country and a rich country, it is the rich country’s interests that tend to prevail. It is inequality in
the relationships between rich countries and poor countries, as well as between citizens of the
former and citizens of the latter, that allow the world’s rich to exploit and oppress the world’s
poor in the ways that Pogge identifies. Therefore, these international relationships are exactly the
sorts of relationships that should be of utmost concern to relational egalitarians.
At this point it is worth addressing some potential objections to what is in the previous
paragraph. It may seem that, in order for there to oppressive relational inequalities between
countries, there must be a global “basic structure.” “Basic structure” is a Rawlsian term for a
society’s main political, economic, and social institutions. There is a longstanding debate in the
field of global justice about whether it makes sense to say that there is a global basic structure
that plays a similar role in the international arena to the role that a basic structure plays in a
single society. Pogge is a prominent participant in this debate, arguing that there is such a
structure. I want to avoid wading into this debate, because I do not see it as relevant to my
argument that there are oppressive relational inequalities between countries. Relations between
countries take place in the context of certain international institutions, such as the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations. I am
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not sure whether these institutions constitute an international basic structure. What is true is that
these institutions currently favor the interests of the world’s rich relative to those of the world’s
poor in ways that Pogge describes in great detail. For example, the bargaining structure of the
WTO is based on a particular norm of reciprocity. This means that “if country A opens its
markets to $10 billion of country B’s exports, B is required to do the same for A. Countries
require tariff concessions of exactly equal value before a deal can be struck.”61 The problem with
this arrangement is that small developing countries are unable to offer large economic powers
much in terms of market access, so they are unable to negotiate reduced trade barriers with rich
countries.62 The important point is that relationships between countries are significantly affected
by inequalities, and that these inequalities often make poor countries vulnerable to being taken
advantage of by rich countries.
Another worry might be that relational egalitarianism is concerned only with the effect of
relational inequalities on individuals, and that inequalities between states is simply a different
topic. My response is to simply point out that states are made up of individuals, and that
individual citizens’ lives are significantly affected by inequalities in relations between states.
Take the above example of how the current WTO negotiating system is biased against many
poor countries. This is worrisome primarily because of its effect on the lives of individuals who
live in poor countries. It is a significant impediment to economic growth—which directly affects
individuals—in developing countries when producers (individuals) of goods in those countries
are unable to sell their goods to buyers living in rich countries because of trade barriers that favor
rich countries’ domestic producers at the expense of their potential competitors in developing
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countries. If relational egalitarians care primarily about the effect of inequality on individuals,
then this concern should cause them to also care about inequalities between countries.
Because of the severe oppressive relational inequalities that exist in the current
international order, there is a strong relational egalitarian argument for reforming international
institutions to give poor countries a way of effectively representing the interests of their citizens.
But what does this have to do with guest worker programs? It is easy to say that the international
order must be reformed so that the world’s poor are treated more justly. Unfortunately, reforming
the international order is extremely difficult. There are a lot of powerful interest groups (where
“interest groups” is defined broadly enough to include countries) that benefit from the current
international order and are thus highly resistant to change. Additionally, the political institutions
in many poor countries are either too dysfunctional or lack the resources necessary to capably
represent the interests of their people. In light of these issues, we (and by “we”, I mean citizens
of developed countries, and especially Americans) should use every tool available to ameliorate
the effects of these oppressive relational inequalities.
The potential of guest worker programs to reduce oppressive relational inequality may
not be immediately obvious, but we should not underestimate it. If international oppressive
relational inequalities facilitate exploitation of poor countries by rich countries, then in addition
to putting an end to this exploitation, rich countries should offer citizens of poor countries a way
out. Guest worker programs provide exactly this opportunity to the extent that they represent a
politically feasible form of immigration. As I argue in chapter one, a policy that would allow
citizens of poor countries to legally work in rich countries is likely to have significant economic
benefits both for migrant workers and for migrant workers’ families (in the form of remittances).
By giving some people who are among the world’s worst off the opportunity to become
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somewhat better off, guest worker programs have the potential to reduce the severity of some
oppressive relational inequalities.
It is curious that Wellman and Walzer fail to recognize the reasons that I have just
explained for relational egalitarians to favor guest worker programs. To speculate a bit, I think
that one reason that relational egalitarians might not give international relational inequalities the
consideration that they deserve is that they assume that relational egalitarian worries apply only
to personal relationships (where “personal” is understood broadly enough to include intra-state
relations, but not so broadly as to include inter-state relations). It is true that some inequalities
that are relatively unproblematic when they occur between people who do not share a robust
personal relationship can become problematic when they occur between people who do. The
following example from Wellman illustrates this nicely: consider a “father/husband who travels
by first-class while his wife and children must go by economy class. What leaps out about this
scenario is not merely that some people get to travel more comfortably than others; it is that such
disparity exists within the context of a family. Were it not for the fact that this man is the
husband and father of these second-class travelers, the example would not be so striking.”63 But
just because some relational inequalities only become concerning for relational egalitarians when
they occur in the context of a personal relationship does not mean that the same is true for all
relational inequalities. This is where I think that my distinction between oppressive relational
inequalities and personally degrading relational inequalities is helpful. Unlike personally
degrading relational inequalities, oppressive relational inequalities can occur even in the absence
of a personal relationship. It is because relational egalitarianism is concerned not just with
personally degrading relational inequalities, but also with oppressive relational inequalities, that
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there are strong relational egalitarian reasons to be concerned with the international order in its
current form.

2.4 Compared to What?
Relational egalitarians oppose guest worker programs, or at least some forms of guest
worker programs, because they worry that these programs put immigrants in situations in which
they are vulnerable to oppression and personal degradation at the hands of their employers and,
more generally, the government and citizens of the country in which they are working. As I have
already acknowledged, these are valid worries, and they deserve to be taken seriously when
crafting public policy related to guest workers. Walzer seems to take these worries to rule out
most guest worker programs. Wellman, taking a more moderate stance, believes that relational
egalitarian worries only rule out guest worker programs with too long of a duration. Against
Walzer and Wellman, I will now suggest some reasons to doubt that these concerns, even when
given the consideration they deserve, significantly undermine the case for temporary worker
programs.
Consider Elena, a woman who immigrated to the United States to find work in
restaurants and the domestic service industry. The restaurant job she found required her to do
long hours of hard work for very low pay, relative to American standards. She worked twelve
hours a day, six days a week, for an hourly wage of $4.16. Hard work for relatively low pay is of
course more or less the norm for life as a low-skilled immigrant in the United States. But things
were even worse than that for Elena: she was denied pay for six months by her employer, and
she was also required to do more and more tasks that were not included in her job description.
This seems to be exactly the kind of situation that causes relational egalitarians to worry
about guest worker programs. Poor immigrants enter a country without the rights and resources
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that citizens enjoy and are thus taken advantage of by unscrupulous employers who try to exploit
immigrants’ disadvantaged and often desperate situations. But there is an important detail about
Elena’s situation that causes her to be especially vulnerable: Elena is not a guest worker, but an
illegal immigrant.64 Elena is far from alone: the Pew Hispanic Research Center estimated that
there were 11.2 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States as of March
2010.65 The US is, unsurprisingly, not alone. As of 2008, according to one estimate, the
European Union had more than 10 million undocumented immigrants living within its borders.66
Elena shares not only her illegal status with millions of other people around the world,
but also a range of experiences that are typical of life as an illegal alien. Many immigrants,
desperate to find a way to support their families because of a lack of decent work opportunities
in their native countries, set off for the United States and other developed countries without even
knowing the kind of work that they will be doing, what they will be paid, or what the terms of
employment will be. To get across the border, prospective illegal immigrants often must pay
thousands of dollars to a “coyote,” or smuggler. They are packed into the backs of dark, hot,
crowded vans and trucks, where they must stay for days at a time without food or even any
sanitary way of relieving themselves.67 Because of the strong presence of border patrol agents in
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American cities on or near the Mexico border, illegal immigrants entering the United States
from Mexico are often forced to cross the border in sparsely-populated but treacherous mountain
and desert regions (whether or not they are aided by a coyote).
Once they succeed in crossing the border, low-skilled illegal immigrants face many of
the same barriers as low-skilled guest workers. Since they often do not speak the language of the
country that is their new home, they face barriers in performing even the most mundane daily
activities. They live in small communities of fellow illegal immigrants that tend to be isolated
from the rest of society. They are usually unfamiliar with laws and procedures in their new
homes, which leaves them at the mercy of their employers. As was the case with Elena,
employers frequently take advantage of this situation by underpaying their undocumented
employees, by subjecting undocumented employees to dangerous workplace conditions, and by
violating the terms of employment agreements.
Many undocumented workers immigrate to find jobs that will allow them to support their
families back in their native countries. However, because of their illegal status, they are unable
to return home to visit their loved ones (because of the high cost and risk associated with
crossing the border to go back to work after their visits home). Illegal immigrants thus have no
choice but to endure the psychological trauma of being separated from their families for months
or years at a time.
The purpose of this discussion is to highlight the inevitable problems that will exist for a
country that elects to pursue a closed-border policy. Philosophers often explicitly make
unrealistic simplifying assumptions so that they are able to reflect on questions about morality
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and justice without getting bogged down in mess empirical debates. Philosophers identify some
desirable ideal, and then think of it as the job of social scientists to figure out how to reach that
ideal, and to figure out how to deal with complicating factors that may emerge as idealizing
assumptions are relaxed. I certainly have nothing against an academic division of labor, and I
acknowledge that philosophers are often not well-qualified to address complicated economic,
sociological, and psychological questions. Obviously, however, the value of philosophical
idealization in specifying goals for societies and states to pursue depends on whether or not
philosophers’ idealizing assumptions are justified. One assumption that philosophers often make
is that when the state decides upon a system of laws, the citizens living under those laws will
obey them. But it is not clear that this is a good assumption to make. In particular, problems
arise when Walzer and Wellman assume universal compliance with restrictive immigration laws.
When human beings have strong incentives, economic or otherwise, to do something,
they tend to be exceptionally innovative at finding ways around legal restrictions on doing it.
The political cartoonist John Trever wittily illustrated this in a piece that depicts construction
workers building a fence on the US-Mexico border under a sign that reads, “Under Construction:
20-Foot High Border Fence.” Meanwhile, on the South side of the border, a man is painting a
sign that reads, “Open Soon: Raul’s 21-Foot Ladder Rentals.”68 If a non-American really wants
to get into the United States, a law prohibiting him from doing so and a fence blocking the
border is probably not going to be enough to stop him. Of course, this does not mean that
nothing could stop immigrants from illegally entering the US; if border patrol agents were
placed every thirty feet along the US-Mexico border from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific
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Ocean with “shoot to kill” orders, I do not doubt that illegal immigration into the United States
would drop off substantially.
Surely less severe “solutions” could be devised as well. But whatever measure is taken to
keep people from legally entering, there are real trade-offs involved, both in terms of the
economic expenses associated with building fences and hiring border patrol agents, and more
importantly the human costs that such controls have on the illegal immigrants themselves.
Advocates of restrictive immigration policies need to take these trade-offs seriously and explain
how we should weigh them against the interests of a country in controlling who legally enters its
territory and against worries about allowing non-citizens to legally enter a country as guest
workers without all the political rights that citizens enjoy. Whether or not one agrees with me
that these considerations should lead us to favor a robust system of reasonably well-designed
guest worker programs, surely one cannot just assume away factors that might pose problems for
one’s favored approach. Walzer seems to be guilty of something like this when he concludes that
guest worker programs are unjust without considering the effects that restrictive immigration
policies have on the people with whom Walzer is primarily concerned during his discussion of
guest worker programs. A country that adopts a law denying immigrants access to its territory
will not completely succeed in actually keeping immigrants from entering its territory. And just
because a person does not have legal authorization to be in a certain territory does not mean that
that person stops being deserving of moral consideration.
Walzer and Wellman worry about the relational inequalities that may exist between
citizens and guest worker immigrants. Whether relational egalitarian worries about guest worker
programs justify opposing guest worker programs depends on what the alternative to guest
worker programs would be. It would be one thing if the alternative to guest worker programs
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were an open borders policy. Practically speaking, however, the alternative to guest worker
programs is often restrictive immigration policies plus lots of illegal immigration. In this section,
I have tried to show that when the alternative to guest worker programs is restrictive
immigration policies plus lots of illegal immigration, relational egalitarian concerns about the
latter should probably outweigh relational egalitarian concerns about the former.

2.5 Conclusion
If my argument has been convincing, then I have shown that there is good reason for
relational egalitarians to favor guest worker programs. But that does not mean that Walzer and
Wellman’s concerns about guest worker programs are completely misplaced, nor that relational
egalitarians must necessarily support any guest worker program. What is important for relational
egalitarians to recognize is the regrettable fact that there are no options currently on the table that
would completely eliminate relational inequalities. Relational egalitarians must weigh available
options to determine which ones would most effectively reduce relational oppression and
personal degradation. There are likely a wide variety of policy options that should be pursued to
further this goal, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to argue for a specific policy that
relational egalitarians should support. What I hope to have demonstrated here is that guest
worker programs have the potential to reduce injustice and inequality in the world, and that guest
worker programs therefore deserve the support of relational egalitarians.

50
WORKS CITED
Altman, Andrew, and Christopher Heath Wellman. A Liberal Theory of International Justice.
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009.
Anderson, Elizabeth S. "What Is the Point of Equality?" Ethics 109.2 (1999): 287-337.
Avril, Pierre. "L'Europe Harmonise Sa Lutte Contre Les Clandestins." Le Figaro.fr. Le Figaro, 6
June 2008.
Benen, Steve. "Romney's Contempt for the '47 Percent'" The Maddow Blog. MSNBC, 18 Sept.
2012.
Brock, Gillian. Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009.
Clemens, Michael. “A Labor Mobility Agenda for Development.” CGD Working Paper
201. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. 2010.
Clemens, Michael, Claudio Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett. "The Place Premium: Wage
Differences for Identical Workers across the US Border." The World Bank: Policy
Research Working Paper. 2008.
Clemens, Michael, and Lant Pritchett. "Income per Natural: Measuring Development for People
Rather Than Places." Population and Development Review 34.3. 2008. 395-434.
CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion. Rep. Paris: International Energy Agency, 2012.
Cohn, D'Vera, and Jeffrey Passel. "Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State
Trends, 2010." Pew Hispanic Center. Pew Research Center, 1 Feb. 2010.
Hamilton, Robert, and John Whalley. "Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Global
Restrictions on Labor Mobility." Journal of Developmental Economics 14. 1984. 61-75.
Jones, Jeffrey. "Americans' Views on Immigration Holding Steady." Gallup Politics. Gallup, 22
June 2011.
Kapur, Devesh, “Remittances: The New Development Mantra?” Paper prepared for the G-24
Technical Meeting. <www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2420045_en.pdf>.
Karasenty, Yogev, and Shmuel Rosner. "What Million Missing Israelis?" Foreign Policy 28 July
2011.
Koebler, Jason. "10 Metro Areas With the Largest Population Growth." US News. U.S.News &
World Report, 6 Apr. 2011.
Kukathas, Chandran. "The Case for Open Immigration." Ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher
Heath Wellman. Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.,
2005. 207-20.

51

Mill, John Stuart, Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social
Philosophy. William J. Ashley, ed. 1909. Library of Economics and Liberty.
McClane, Brianna and Shannon Mehner. "Exploited Immigrants, Unaware of Labor Laws,
Afraid to Fight Mistreatment." Medill Reports-Chicago. Northwestern University, 20
May 2010.
Pogge, Thomas Winfried Menko. "Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation." Freedom from
Poverty as a Human Right. Paris: Oxford UP ; UNESCO, 2009, 11-53.
Pogge, Thomas Winfried Menko. "Migration and Poverty." Citizenship and Exclusion. Ed.
Veit-Michael Bader. New York: St. Martin's, 1997. 12-27.
Pogge, Thomas Winfried Menko. World Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity, 2008.
Pritchett, Lant. Let Their People Come: Breaking the Gridlock on International Labor Mobility.
Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2006.
Razin, Assaf, and Efraim Sadka. "Unskilled Migration: A Burden or a Boon for the Welfare
State?" Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102.3 (2000): 463-79.
Rivera-Batiz, Francisco, "Illegal Immigrants in the U.S. Economy: A Comparative Analysis of
Mexican and Non-Mexican Undocumented Workers," in Slobodan Djajic, ed.,
International Migration: Trends, Policy and Economic Impact. London: Routledge
Publishers, 2001, 180-203.
Smith, James, and Barry Edmonston, eds. The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and
Fiscal Effects of Immigration. Rep. Washington, DC: National Academy, 1997. The
National Academies Press. National Research Council.
Study With Milton Friedman. Perf. Milton Friedman. FR33MINDS, 2009. DVD.
Sumption, Madeleine, and Will Somerville. The UK's New Europeans: Progress and
Challenges Five Years After Accession" Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2010.
Trever, John. "Raul's 21-Foot Ladder Rentals." Cartoon. Albuquerque Journal 24 Sept. 2006,
Editorial sec.
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2011
Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Washington, D.C.: 2012.
Walzer, Michael. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic,
1983.
Wellman, Christopher Heath, and Phillip Cole. Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a
Right to Exclude? Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011.

52
Williams, Daniel. "Unemployment, Poor Housing Slow Immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel."
Los Angeles Times, 29 Dec. 1991.
World Bank. Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration.
The World Bank. 2005.
Yaffe, Nurit, and Dorith Tal. Immigration to Israel from the Former Soviet Union. Rep.
Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Immigration Absorption, 2001.

